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Abstract  
We explore empirically the transmission of U.S. financial and macroeconomic uncertainty to emerging 
market economies (EMEs). We start by assuming that there are crucial differences between volatility and 
uncertainty, and between the latter and its shocks. With the help of Bayesian vector autoregressions, we 
first identify two measures of U.S. uncertainty shocks, which appear to explain the dynamics of output 
developments better than conventional volatility measures. Next, we find evidence that adverse shocks to 
U.S. aggregate uncertainty are associated with marked contractions in some EMEs’ business cycles. 
However, we detect significant cross-country heterogeneity in the responses of EMEs’ business cycles to 
U.S uncertainty shocks. We also find generalized declines in stock market values, which supports the so-
called Global Financial Cycle hypothesis.  
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1 Introduction 
Over the past three decades, several developing countries have witnessed ever-closer market 
integration within the global economy. As a result, the responses of their macroeconomic 
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conditions to global fluctuations have become tighter. Existing research shows that deeper 
international interdependence between asset markets could result either from stronger structural 
transmission of business cycles fluctuations, or simply from larger shocks (see Bua and Trecroci 
2019, for some empirical evidence). However, there is no clear-cut evidence as to the channels 
through which asset prices and macroeconomic conditions in emerging market economies (EMEs) 
react to developments originating in advanced countries. In principle, the international 
transmission of monetary and financial impulses may occur through observed changes in the term 
structure of local interest rates and in the market valuation of other assets. In practice, several real-
world factors beyond the appreciation of the econometrician are likely to play a significant role in 
the propagation of shocks. One of them is aggregate uncertainty. In this paper, we identify shocks 
to U.S. aggregate uncertainty and measure their spillovers – of the macroeconomic and financial 
type – on EMEs’ level of economic activity and key asset prices. 
Money and uncertainty are inextricably linked. In a world of certainty, known, fixed relative prices 
allow production, consumption and investment to proceed along pre-arranged lines, so that the 
only service of money is as an inventory. In contrast, under uncertainty, the main function of money 
becomes to alleviate transaction costs. This close association is a first motive why we investigate 
the output impact of uncertainty jointly with money and liquidity conditions. Investors and 
consumers forecast future cash flows through some complex learning process that reflects 
uncertainty about their distributional properties. Cognitive limitations and/or shortage of degrees 
of freedom likely force agents to under-parameterize and frequently change their forecasting 
models. Accordingly, we compute estimates of U.S. uncertainty shocks under very general 
assumptions about the information set and that are fully endogenous with respect to the state of 
the economy.  
Given the international prominence of the dollar and U.S. financial markets, U.S. monetary and 
financial developments tend to have a disproportionate global impact. Both the Great Financial 
Crisis started in 2007-8 and the so-called “taper tantrum”, i.e., the market responses to changes in 
U.S. monetary and funding conditions in 2013-14, had significant impacts on EMEs’ financial and 
macroeconomic dynamics (Cerutti et al. 2019). The dynamics of those and other events confirm 
that the propagation of U.S. impulses to other countries’ economic activity and asset values is a 
function of several elements. The literature highlights three broad channels of transmission: 
exchange-rate variations, trade linkages and other monetary and financial interdependences (see 
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for instance Ammer et al. 2016). For obvious reasons the latter provide for a swifter pass-through, 
although a particularly complex one to ascertain. 
Several types of shocks could trigger more or less synchronized fluctuations in EMEs, mostly 
through changes in the external value of collateral assets. The DSGE model of Mendoza (2010) 
examines the implications of various shocks – including imported input prices, global interest rates 
and productivity shocks – for real activity. This evidence helps explain why the abrupt slowdowns 
or reversals of capital inflows observed in EMEs are often followed by financial stress, during which 
losses to net worth and tightening margins can also lead to co-movement. In a setting with multiple 
assets, risky asset prices might co-move (even though their cash flows are independently 
distributed) because they are exposed to the same funding liquidity constraints. Losses can also 
generate co-movement of assets held by common investors. Finding evidence of substantial 
financial spillovers of U.S. monetary policy on a global scale, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020) 
argue: “U.S. monetary policy shocks induce comovements in the international financial variables 
that characterize the Global Financial Cycle” (see also Cerutti et al. 2019 and Jorda et al. 2019). 
Macroeconomics conventionally equates risk (in particular lower-tail risk) with uncertainty and 
measures the former with volatility. However, we believe that it is empirically important to 
distinguish between volatility, which measures the dispersion of outcomes in a known distribution, 
and uncertainty. Both may affect macroeconomic and financial outcomes, in several ways. 
However, more than volatility, it is heteroskedasticity of shocks and fundamentals that may 
influence investors' and consumers’ ability to identify the distribution of future payoffs. Forecasts 
of key market variables are, plausibly, the outcome of some complex learning process that reflects 
uncertainty. In turn, the latter is the conditional volatility of an event that is unforecastable from 
the perspective of economic agents. Therefore, we follow Jurado et al. (2015) and measure 
uncertainty as the standard error of the n-step-ahead forecast error. The fundamental processes of 
macroeconomic variables, whose drift rates depend on changes in investment opportunities, may 
drive the business cycle of open economies. As agents strive to learn the state of the global 
economy, the variance of their forecast errors fluctuates, thereby affecting consumption and 
investment choices, as well as their aggregate implications. Excess financial volatility during bad 
times, for example, might reflect - though not coincide with -a jump to higher uncertainty. 
We study the joint impact of uncertainty shocks and U.S. funding conditions for the dynamics of 
economic activity and asset values of nine important emerging economies using quarterly data 
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over the past four decades. Our analysis departs from most existing studies as we employ a novel 
combination of methodology and data that overcomes some well-known weaknesses of the 
existing evidence. Empirical work on this question should take into account crucial differences 
between volatility and uncertainty, and between the latter and its shocks. Therefore, our procedure 
involves two steps. First, we employ a Bayesian VAR model for the U.S. economy, including an 
indicator of aggregate U.S. uncertainty, to identify the structural shocks to uncertainty and to 
financial conditions. Second, we estimate a VAR model for each country, where, assuming that 
shocks to U.S.-based uncertainty could shape global developments, they enter as an exogenous 
regressor. We then assess the local, country-by-country effects of uncertainty shocks on 
macroeconomic aggregates and key asset valuations. As opposed to a panel approach, our 
procedure yields comprehensive evidence on the transmission mechanism and on country 
heterogeneity in the responses. For a preliminary hint of our evidence, in Figure 1 we plot the 
quarterly time series of the median of the shocks we obtain by alternatively inserting a financial 
(dashed black line) or a macroeconomic (continuous red line) uncertainty indicator in our Bayesian 
VAR for the U.S.. The chart also shows the demeaned (and rescaled) VIX real-time index of implied 
volatility of the S&P 500 index and in shaded bars the NBER-dated periods in which the US 
economy was in recession. Negative values of the uncertainty shocks indicate an unexpected fall in 
uncertainty. Some key stylized facts emerge. The two uncertainty series are positively correlated, 
but the timings of peaks and troughs, as well as the volatility and persistence properties, exhibit a 
few differences, in relation to the VIX too. The Great Financial Crisis and in general the second part 
of the sample show more frequent and persistent uncertainty shocks, especially of the macro 
variety. In contrast, the simple volatility index is more persistent and it spikes with shorter lags in 
correspondence of downturns of economic activity.  
Besides uncovering rich country-by-country dynamics, this study yields two main contributions to 
the debate. First, in contrast to most of the extant evidence, we detect significant cross-country 
differences in the responses of EMEs’ business cycles to U.S. uncertainty shocks. We detect 
sizeable adverse effects of shocks to U.S. uncertainty on the level of economic activity in some 
EMEs, whereas in other countries the impact is less clear. Inflation, interest rates, credit aggregates 
and capital flows too react along quantitatively different lines: some economies seem more tightly 
connected with U.S. monetary and uncertainty developments than others. We thus confirm that 
EMEs’ differences in macro-financial vulnerabilities or institutional arrangements (or both) may 
imply important heterogeneities in the exposure of local business cycles to international shocks. 
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Furthermore, the equity valuations of most emerging countries we consider experience a 
significant and persistent correction. This evidence supports the hypothesis that U.S. aggregate 
uncertainty is an important driver of the so-called “Global Financial Cycle” (Miranda-Agrippino and 
Rey 2020). 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The next Section provides a brief review of the 
evidence on the effects of US monetary policy and uncertainty on EMEs. Section 3 sets out the 
methodology and present estimation results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Discussion of the literature 
Security prices embed a risk-premium component that depends on volatility and on the risk 
aversion of market participants. Both elements are time varying at the global and the local level. 
Therefore, risk premia are sensitive to revisions in market expectations of underlying business 
conditions. In turn, these stem from changes in the subjective probability distribution of 
macroeconomic risks and to the uncertainty surrounding those revisions. Indeed, it is increasingly 
clear that variations in risk premia have first-order impacts on economic activity (see Gilchrist and 
Zakrajsek 2012, for instance). Both the finance and macroeconomics literatures extensively show 
that first and second moments of key variables tend to display very different statistical properties 
across tranquil and crisis periods. Financial markets are characterized by low-uncertainty, non-
crisis periods, infrequently interspersed by high-uncertainty intervals of severe stress. In 
measurement, situations in which we know both the future outcomes and their probability 
distribution are commonly classified as risk (more or less conventionally insurable). On the other 
hand, when events or outcomes are known but their probabilities are not, we are in the area of 
uncertainty (not easily insurable; Knight 1921).  
The term “financial cycle” has recently gained centre ground in policy debates. It refers to the self-
reinforcing interactions between perceptions of value and risk, risk-taking, and financing 
constraints (Borio 2014). The basic idea is that particularly favourable credit and monetary 
conditions prop up asset prices, which in turn drive up collateral valuations and therefore expand 
the amount of credit provided to the private sector, until the process goes into sharp reverse. The 
mutually reinforcing interdependence between funding conditions, market valuations and risks has 
tended to accompany and maybe cause long-term adverse macroeconomic effects. In theory, 
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similarly to what happens in a closed-economy context for firms and households, the presence of 
various financial frictions might affect a country’s net worth and its ability to borrow on the global 
markets. The relevance of imperfections is probably even stronger in an open-economy context, 
because funding flows are costlier to monitor and enforce and information asymmetries are 
greater, influencing access to international finance more than to domestic finance (Borio and Zhu 
2012; Bruno and Shin 2015; Coimbra and Rey 2018). Both supply- and demand-side factors are 
likely to play important roles, although to a different extent in relation to local characteristics. For 
instance, the relevance of the so-called bank-lending channel varies across countries, and it might 
be higher in bank-dominated systems. In countries where the funding role of capital markets is 
relatively important, firms and households enjoy external finance alternatives, whereas in bank-
based systems fewer options might exist. Shin (2012) and Rey (2015) highlight that changes in 
liquidity intermediated globally by banks (and interacting with U.S. monetary policy) can lead to 
more pronounced and synchronised national fluctuations. The magnitude of those variations 
seems to relate to countries’ institutions and operational arrangements. For example, countries 
with market-based financial systems tend to exhibit greater cyclicality in leverage. As changes in 
leverage and liquidity affect the real economy, financial shocks can consequently have a greater 
real impact. From a methodological point of view, this calls for leaning towards single-country 
approaches, which is the way we proceed in this paper, as opposed to the pooled, panel-data 
analyses that are very common in the extant literature.  
The research has so far primarily focused on uncertainty as a driver of economic fluctuations, 
mostly in the context of closed economies. Bloom (2014) is a recent survey of this literature, which 
offers some evidence of contractionary domestic effects of US uncertainty shocks (see also Bekaert 
et al. 2013). On the other hand, Ludvigson et al. (2019) find that macro uncertainty rises 
endogenously in response to real activity shocks, contributing strongly to its countercyclical 
behaviour.  
Recently, uncertainty has entered the research into the international propagation of monetary and 
macroeconomic shocks. In general, international asset markets equate the flows of savings and 
investment at a global level. Monetary and financial shocks affect the relative prices of risky assets, 
which reflect the equalization of global investors’ portfolio demands for domestic or foreign assets 
to the available stocks. Therefore, with low transaction costs, local asset prices may react to 
changes in portfolio weights triggered by global shifts in asset values, wealth, financial conditions, 
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risk aversion and expectations. Indeed, macroeconomic models increasingly often include 
reduced-form risk premium shocks, and many contributions find that in fact they are relevant in 
explaining fluctuations of real activity (e.g., Christiano et al. 2014). Likewise, several studies identify 
proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty that tend to rise sharply at the onset of downturns (Jurado 
et al. 2015), while there is growing evidence that uncertainty itself might even cause them 
(Alessandri and Mumtaz 2019, Ludvigson et al. 2019).  
Rey (2015) yields evidence of international implications of variation in a measure of U.S. risk 
aversion. It also provides key motivation for our paper, as it finds a significant correlation between 
US stock market volatility, as measured by the VIX, and global asset prices and credit flows 
(Cuaresma et al. 2020 corroborates these findings using a Bayesian VAR with factor stochastic 
volatility). An implication of these findings is that open-economy models should allow macro 
uncertainty to exert some effects on both real activity and asset values, which we do in our 
empirical specification.  
The outsized international impact of U.S. monetary policy has been the object of several analyses. 
For instance, Dedola et al. (2017), Iacoviello and Navarro (2019) and Mehrotra et al. (2019) identify 
sizeable interest rate spillovers from the United States on to advanced and emerging economies’ 
macroeconomic aggregates. Early contributions have measured U.S. financial uncertainty shocks 
with the VIX or VXO. Other authors consider different notions, like policy uncertainty (Colombo 
2013 and Caggiano et al. 2019). Recently, some works have focused on global uncertainty (e.g. Choi 
2018, Bonciani and Ricci 2018, Ahir et al. 2018, and Castelnuovo 2019).  
The contributions most closely related to ours are those analysing the spillovers of U.S. uncertainty 
shocks on emerging countries. Carrière-Swallow and Cespedes (2013) study the effects of an 
exogenous change in the VXO index on consumption and investments in advanced and EMEs 
countries, finding that the latter experience stronger contractionary outcomes. As we argued 
above, country-specific characteristics such as the quality of business institutions, the depth of the 
local financial sector, and the degree of financial dollarization influence the dynamic responses of 
local variables. 
Choi (2018) studies the effects of VIX shocks on the U.S. and 18 emerging economies using two-
country VARs with block exogeneity. The results show that VIX shocks have recessionary effects 
on EME countries that are greater than on the U.S. and that financial frictions in credit markets act 
as the main propagation mechanism. Bhattarai et al. (2019) investigate the effects of identified VIX 
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shocks on 18 emerging countries using a Bayesian panel-VAR and finding relevant financial and 
macroeconomic spillovers. We depart from this work in various respects. First, we do not rely on 
the VIX but on the Jurado et al. (2015) measures of uncertainty. Second, our time sample is longer. 
Third, we identify U.S. shocks through a richer model for the U.S. that controls also for financial 
factors. Fourth, we estimate separate models for the EMEs so that we do not impose any kind of 
homogeneity constraint on coefficients and responses across countries. 
Empirical findings about the macroeconomic role of uncertainty depend on two key 
methodological choices: measuring uncertainty and identifying an uncertainty shock. Most of the 
existing literature has used the notions of volatility, risk aversion and uncertainty almost 
interchangeably. Therefore, most studies identify uncertainty by relying on proxies or a single time 
series, such as the implied or realized volatility of stock market returns, the cross-sectional 
dispersion of firm profits, stock returns, the cross-sectional dispersion of subjective (survey-based) 
forecasts, or the recurrence of certain “uncertainty-related” keywords in news publications. In most 
cases, the simple proxies directly enter a VAR model as an endogenous variable. Relevant examples 
are Bloom (2009), Caggiano et al. (2014), Basu and Bundick (2017) and Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2019), 
in which stock market volatility, realized or as implied in the prices of index options contracts, is 
used to proxy for uncertainty.  
We crucially depart from this influential strand of the literature under two important respects. Our 
key premise is that agents do not know the true distribution of shocks and therefore they must use 
data to make inferences about it. This means that, although volatility and uncertainty might be 
related, they are distinct factors. The key hypothesis of this paper is that the arrival of new 
information and agents’ uncertainty have defined implications on the valuation of macroeconomic 
risks. Agents engage in systematic learning, aimed at extracting and updating forecasts of risks to 
future cash flows. The main drawback of the volatility indicators employed in much of the existing 
literature is that their time variation may depend on market factors only partly related with agents’ 
ability to identify the distribution of future cash flows, especially at the typical business-cycle 
frequency. In response to these problems, some authors construct uncertainty indicators starting 
from subjective or objective data; e.g. Bachmann et al. (2013) use business surveys and Baker et al. 
(2016) rely on newspaper coverage. Even though they seem useful to investigate some aspects 
related to volatility, these proxies too seem only loosely associated with a distinct notion of 
macroeconomic or financial uncertainty. To overcome this issue, Jurado et al. (2015) build 
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composite macroeconomic and financial uncertainty indicators based on a rich dataset of both 
kinds of time series and show that they have strong real effects. Other authors argue that estimates 
from models with external uncertainty indicators may embed a generated-regressors bias that 
invalidate inference. Therefore, Carriero et al. (2018a), Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019) and 
Cuaresma et al. (2020) propose to measure both uncertainty and its effects in a single step within 
the same model. The latter paper identifies international uncertainty shocks as the joint volatility 
process that determines the dynamics of the variance-covariance matrix of the common factors in 
a large-scale Bayesian VAR. 
We employ the composite indicators by Jurado et al. (2015). These measures better track at a 
business-cycle frequency the extent to which agents are uncertain about the true values of 
macroeconomic and financial variables, as well as of the model parameters employed to forecast 
them. 
Our second departure from previous studies concerns the identification of uncertainty shocks. 
There is no clear consensus in the VAR literature on the appropriate identification strategy. This 
difficulty comes from the fact that in this area it is hard to find unambiguous theoretical restrictions 
to apply. Consequently, most contributions identify uncertainty shocks by relying on a recursive 
identification scheme implemented through Cholesky decomposition of the residuals' variance-
covariance matrix, as for example in Bloom (2009) and Jurado et al. (2015). However, this approach 
disregards the possible presence of contemporaneous feedbacks between uncertainty and the 
other variables in the model. We believe this is particularly consequential for the tight relationship 
between funding conditions and uncertainty. Accordingly, Angelini et al. (2019), Carriero et al. 
(2018a) and Ludvigson et al. (2019) propose new identification strategies. In particular, to achieve 
set identification Ludvigson et al. (2019) impose constraints on the timing, magnitude and 
correlation among the shocks, but not on the impulse response functions as in the classical sign-
restrictions approach. They use shock-based constraints in which the uncertainty shock is required 
to satisfy some qualitative and quantitative restrictions connected to historical events and other 
constraints that require the shock to be correlated with some external variables. Their results show 
financial uncertainty as exogenous and macroeconomic uncertainty as endogenous. This approach 
presents some difficulty for the univocal identification of uncertainty shocks in large VAR systems, 
where one should at least check that the imposed restrictions do not yield series of other shocks 
with implausible features. Carriero et al. (2018a) and Angelini et al. (2019) exploit 
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heteroskedasticity to achieve identification in a VAR setup. In contrast to Ludvigson et al. (2019), 
Carriero et al (2018a) find evidence that financial uncertainty is endogenous while macroeconomic 
uncertainty is exogenous. Finally, Angelini et al. (2019) argue that both macroeconomic and 
financial uncertainty are exogenous, whereas Redl (2020) extracts estimates of macro and financial 
uncertainty for 11 advanced economies. 
External variables are used by Carriero et al (2015) and Piffer and Podstawski (2018), who apply the 
methodology described in Stock and Watson (2018) to identify uncertainty shocks. This method 
still relies on some proxy for uncertainty, which is assumed to be exogenous to the economy, and 
neglects possible two-way feedbacks between uncertainty and the business cycle. 
Carriero et al. (2015) test the performance of recursive and proxy SVARs with data generated from 
a DSGE model; they also reconsider the analysis of Bloom (2009) using the VXO index as indicator 
variable for financial uncertainty and a dummy variable as external instrument to identify shocks. 
Both exercises show that estimates from recursive VAR models are likely downward-biased, while 
models based on external proxies produce impulse responses close to the underlying DSGE 
responses. In turn, Piffer and Podstawski (2018) merge set identification with proxy-SVAR to 
identify both uncertainty and news shocks2.  
The interdependence between uncertainty and financial conditions and its relevance for 
identification is an important issue to take into account. Indeed, recent studies consider financial 
frictions as powerful means of propagation of uncertainty shocks in the economy (Popp and Zhang 
2016, Alessandri and Mumtaz 2019). For this reason, Caldara et al. (2016) identify uncertainty and 
financial shocks in a VAR model using a penalty function that assumes that the shocks of interest 
generate the largest increase in an uncertainty measure over a certain horizon3.  
 
3 Methodology and estimation 
                                                          
2 The proxy for uncertainty is the change in the price of gold around some unanticipated events that potentially affected 
uncertainty and were orthogonal to other macroeconomic shocks. 
3 This approach boils down to a Cholesky decomposition when the penalty function only considers the impact of the 
shocks. They estimate several different models in which a measure of uncertainty is coupled with the excess bond 
premium to capture financial shocks. These two measures are placed first in the VAR model and their order is 
alternated to evaluate the effect of different orderings. 
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This section describes the models and methodologies used in our analysis, and then presents our 
main results. As discussed, among others, by Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020), Obstfeld (2020) 
and Gourinchas et al. (2019), the U.S. dollar’s role in the international monetary system as a 
premium reserve currency, a funding currency, an invoicing currency for trade, and a vehicle 
currency in the foreign exchange market makes it a primary channel of shocks to liquidity. The 
yields of dollar assets likely incorporate a liquidity premium that rises in periods of high uncertainty 
and financial stress, when the risk-taking attitude of investors and intermediaries recedes. 
Conversely, during low uncertainty, risk-on intervals, the demand and market valuation of non-U.S. 
assets increases. Thus, we might see U.S. yields and spreads as related to uncertainty on 
international capital markets; we account for this in the specification of our empirical models. 
However, we leave aside the important topic of the possible feedback impact from other 
economies’ response onto the US cycle. 
Our procedure involves two steps. First, we estimate for the U.S. economy a Bayesian VAR model 
that includes a composite indicator of uncertainty, and we use it to characterize the structural 
shocks to financial conditions and aggregate uncertainty. In order to obtain the shocks to financial 
and macroeconomic uncertainty, we alternatively employ two variants of the VAR model for the 
U.S.. Second, we build a Bayesian VAR model for each country, where, assuming that U.S. 
uncertainty shapes global uncertainty, its shocks enter as an exogenous regressor. We therefore 
investigate the local effects of uncertainty shocks by analysing the impulse response function and 
historical decomposition. Our choice of quarterly data strikes an equilibrium between the relatively 
high-frequency changes in financial variables and uncertainty and the lower frequency of typical 
business-cycle fluctuations. Besides, data availability is a constraining issue for EMEs4.  
3.1 The U.S. model 
Our key hypothesis about uncertainty is that at a business-cycle frequency the continuous arrival 
of new information and agents’ uncertainty interact in ways that measures of stock market 
volatility cannot fully capture. We assume that agents engage systematically in a learning activity 
on the state of the economy. This leads to the extraction and update of forecasts of future values 
of variables and parameters relevant for their choices. Consequently, to measure U.S. uncertainty 
we use, alternatively, two monthly composite indicators, one for financial uncertainty and another 
                                                          
4
 In particular, official capital flows figures from the IMF are only available at quarterly frequency. 
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for macroeconomic uncertainty, both introduced by Jurado et al. (2015). These proxies aggregate, 
respectively, 147 financial time series and 132 macroeconomic variables. Caldara et al. (2016) find 
that these measures give economic uncertainty the maximal role in explaining business cycle 
fluctuations. Our identification strategy implies that they are exogenous for the US economy. We 
saw above that the evidence about the endogeneity of uncertainty is mixed: according to Carriero 
et al. (2018b), macroeconomic uncertainty is exogenous and financial uncertainty is endogenous, 
whereas Ludvigson et al. (2019) find the opposite. Overall, even though their results seem at odds 
with each other, both studies recommend that uncertainty indicators should not be ordered last in 
a VAR, as this would cloud the measures of their true impact on the economy. Accordingly, Angelini 
et al. (2019) show that both indicators are exogenous.In our specification, we order the uncertainty 
proxy first in the VAR and then apply zero short-run restrictions with the Cholesky decomposition 
of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. This choice has a twofold motivation. First, the 
shocks we retrieve can be interpreted as structural if uncertainty is predetermined with respect to 
the other variables in the system. Secondly, the impulse responses we deriveare the generalized 
response functions described in Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), i.e. they are the 
difference between a conditional and an unconditional projection of the VAR model, where the 
conditioning set is the shock to the variable of interest. Furthermore, our implied impulse 
responses are consistent with results by other studies that employ less parsimonious identification 
schemes. 
We write our reduced-form VAR model in companion form as 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐵𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡,     𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0, Σ) 
We estimate the model through Bayesian inference and follow the approach of Banbura et al. 
(2010), which allows to deal with high-dimensionality VARs. The rationale behind the large BVARs 
is that by using informative priors it is possible to shrink the likely over-parameterized model 
toward a more parsimonious specification and thus reduce estimation uncertainty. Therefore, the 
choice on the informativeness of the priors is crucial. Here, we follow Giannone et al. (2015), i.e., 
we select the appropriate degree of shrinkage by treating priors’ hyper-parameters as additional 
unknown parameters, formulating a prior over them and maximizing the marginal likelihood to 
derive their posterior values. We use a Normal-Inverse-Wishart distribution as prior for the 
coefficient and the variance-covariance matrix of the errors: Σ~𝐼𝑊(Ψ, 𝑑) 
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𝛽|Σ~𝑁(𝑏, Σ ⊗ Ω) 
Here Ψ, 𝑑, 𝑏 and Ω are functions of a set of hyperparameters 𝛾. The conditional prior for the VAR 
coefficients 𝑏 allows to achieve Bayesian shrinkage by combining three prior densities: the 
Minnesota, the sum-of-coefficients and dummy-initial-observation priors. The Minnesota prior 
assumes that the limiting form of each VAR equation is a random walk with drift. The sum-of-
coefficients prior and the dummy-initial-observation prior are necessary to account for unit root 
and cointegration. The tightness of these priors is determined by the three hyperparameters 𝜆, 𝜇, 
and 𝛿, respectively. All the hyperparameters are treated as unknown so that the model has a 
hierarchical structure. Computationally, the algorithm features a Metropolis step to draw the 
vector of hyperparameters and then, conditional on the value of 𝛾, the VAR parameters are drawn 
from their posterior, which too is the Normal-Inverse-Wishart. This algorithm generates 20.000 
draws, of which we discard the first 10,000 as burn-in and use the last 10,000 for inference. Further 
details on the prior specification and estimation procedure are in Giannone et al. (2015).This 
framework allows to estimate the VAR in levels, with variables expressed in annualized terms; we 
include 5 lags of the endogenous variables.  
Our modelling strategy assumes that several factors, well beyond any single measure of the 
interest rate, jointly influence financial conditions and, through them, economic activity. 
Accordingly, our VAR system for the U.S. includes the uncertainty composite indicator, associated 
to either financial or macroeconomic uncertainty, plus six U.S.-specific variables and two 
international indices. The U.S. quantities are real GDP and GDP-deflator based inflation, the excess 
bond premium of Gilchrist and Zakrajzek (2012), real stock prices based on the S&P500 index and 
the CPI, the ratio to GDP of credit to the private sector and the 1-year government bond yield. To 
control for global drivers of economic fluctuations we also include the CRB index of commodity 
prices and the nominal effective exchange rate.  
In line with some of the extant investigations, we include the excess bond premium to account for 
the evolution of funding conditions. It is a measure of investors' risk appetite in the corporate bond 
market that captures the cyclical changes in the relationship between measured default risk and 
credit spreads. Its rise signals heightened perceived risk aversion and uncertainty. The literature 
finds that it significantly affects economic activity: an increase in the excess bond premium reflects 
a reduction in the effective risk-bearing capacity of the financial sector, with recessionary effects 
on the economy through a contraction in the supply of credit.  
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We include stock prices and credit to the private sector to account for the likely interdependence 
of uncertainty with the financial side of the economy. The 1-year government bond yield is useful 
to capture the effects of monetary policy actions on longer-term yields and to overcome the 
drawbacks of conventional policy rates in the periods characterized by the zero lower bound and 
nonconventional monetary policy interventions. Gertler and Karadi (2015) use the 1-year yield as 
the monetary policy indicator as its innovations incorporate the effects of surprises in the current 
funds rate but also revisions to forward guidance.  
Uncertainty indices and the excess bond premium are available at a monthly frequency, so we 
transform them into quarterly series by averaging their values over the quarter. We estimate the 
system over the sample 1979-2018. The starting date of the sample depends on the Jurado et al. 
(2015) uncertainty measures, as they are not available prior to 1979. 
Reverting to Figure 1, the VAR-implied financial (dashed black line) and macroeconomic 
(continuous red line) U.S. uncertainty shocks are positively correlated (simultaneous coefficient: 
0.37). Their simultaneous correlations with the VIX are positive but low (0.19 for macro, 0.17 for 
financial uncertainty), confirming that uncertainty and volatility in the data track substantially 
different phenomena. We notice too some substantial differences in the interactions of recession 
intervals with the level and type of uncertainty. The latter half of the sample shows more frequent 
and persistent uncertainty shocks, especially of the macro type.  
In Figure 2, panel a, we plot the impulse response functions from the U.S. model, estimated using 
the financial uncertainty composite indicator. The responses show that the uncertainty shock 
triggers significant recessionary effects, with a GDP trough about 4-5 quarters after the shock; 
inflation and commodity prices fall too. This evidence points to a steady decline in economic 
activity, as in Jurado et al. (2015), rather than a volatility overshoot (Bloom, 2009). The response of 
the excess bond premium and credit point to a contraction too in funding conditions, with a lag 
profile - notice the swift reaction of the former - that is in line with existing evidence. Interestingly, 
our estimates capture a significant and substantial downward reaction of stock market valuations 
and bond yields, fitting a dynamics that is very close to recent theoretical models of the effects of 
financial shocks (Kiyotaki and Moore 2019). This picture also corroborates the idea that uncertainty 
shocks engender essentially demand-side contractionary responses (Leduc and Liu 2016).  
Figure 2, panel b, shows the impulse responses we extract when the macro uncertainty shock 
enters the model instead. The reactions of macroeconomic variables indicate a deeper and much 
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more persistent downturn following this variety of uncertainty shock. This difference is remarkable 
also because it confirms that the use of uncertainty indicators based on financial information only 
is likely to miss important elements of evidence. Overall, the responses highlight a strong 
transmission of uncertainty shocks throughout the U.S. economy, along lines very similar to those 
Ludvigson et al. (2019) and other studies gather. 
 
3.2 EMEs’ macroeconomic dynamics 
We now proceed to investigate the effects of U.S. uncertainty on nine major emerging market 
economies: Brazil, China, Czech Republic, India, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and 
Turkey. For each country, we estimate a VAR model in which the contemporaneous value plus 8 
lags of the uncertainty shock enter as exogenous regressors; we then compute the impulse 
response functions with respect to it. We estimate single-country models, rather than pooled 
regressions as in the panel perspective often adopted in the literature, because of the need to 
account for cross-country heterogeneity. In particular, we believe that there are important 
differences, in time variation and other dynamic structural features, amongst EMEs that a pooled 
approach would blur. Empirical evidence (see for instance Ahmed et al. 2017; Mehrotra et al. 2019) 
confirms that the effects of changes in U.S. interest rates critically depend on the extent to which 
the receiving economy displays macro-financial vulnerabilities. Last, differences in data availability 
for some countries would yield weakly consistent estimates, an overlooked problem in existing 
analyses.   
In order to capture salient business-cycle and macro-finance features, we build a VAR specification 
extended to key asset values. In particular, we include the following dependent variables at 
quarterly frequency: real GDP, the GDP deflator, the ratios over GDP of credit to the private sector 
and of capital inflows, real house prices and real stock prices, a short-term interest rate and the real 
effective exchange rate. We include house prices and stock prices to evaluate the effects of changes 
of U.S. uncertainty shocks on local assets and to account for their role in the transmission 
mechanism of the shocks. As for the short-term rate, we aim at capturing the behaviour of the 
monetary authority; for this reason, we choose an interest rate tightly correlated with the policy 
rate (see Table 1 for its definition). Commodity prices are a relevant source of inflation and business 
fluctuations for emerging economies, therefore we also include the contemporaneous value of the 
CRB index of commodity prices as an exogenous regressor. Real GDP, the GDP deflator, real house 
prices, real stock prices, the real effective exchange rate and commodity prices all enter in log 
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levels, while the other variables in plain levels. Some of the variables are not available for all the 
countries in our sample, so that the VAR models exclude one or two of the variables listed above. 
The estimation sample starts in Q2 1982 and ends in Q4 2018. For some countries, we use shorter 
samples due to data availability. Table 1 summarizes the dataset information. We consider 5 lags 
of the endogenous variables. 
As for the U.S., we estimate the models for the EMEs by relying on Bayesian inference. For the 
priors, we follow a setup similar to the previous step, i.e. we use the Normal-Inverse-Wishart prior 
and combine it with the dummy-initial-observation and sum-of-coefficients priors. In this case, 
hyperparameters are fixed so that the models are comparable across countries. More in details, we 
specify a Minnesota prior for the coefficients with overall tightness of 0.01. The tightness of the 
dummy-initial-observation and the sum-of-coefficients priors are 0.01 and 0.1, respectively. These 
two priors account for unit root and cointegration; our setup favours cointegration over unit roots, 
which we see as a reasonable assumption.5 
We generate 5000 draws from the posterior distributions of the parameters; we discard the first 
2000 draws while we retain the last 3000 for inference. The results are shown in Figures from 3 to 
10; we organize the plots by variable so as to simplify comparisons amongst countries. 
We complement our analysis by considering the contribution of each structural shock to the 
historical dynamics of the data series. This historical decomposition is displayed in Figures from 11 
to 19. The charts show the contribution of each structural shock to the actual values of the 
variables. For this reason, the output depends on the variables included in the model and on the 
identification strategy. Here, our ultimate goal is to assess the contribution of the uncertainty 
shock, which is exogenous, so that for the endogenous shocks we apply a Cholesky decomposition 
and order the variables as listed at the beginning of this section. Further, we compute the historical 
decomposition for every draw of the posterior distribution, and show the median result. 
Figures 3-11 show the impulse response functions to financial (blue areas) and macroeconomic (red 
lines) uncertainty shocks for the nine countries in our sample.  
Starting with the response of GDP (Figure 3), we find that a U.S. financial uncertainty shock has a 
significant and strong contractionary impact in some of the countries, notably Russia, India, Turkey 
and Czech Republic, whilst for the others the effect is weaker or not significant outright. For China 
it is small but significant. On the other hand, only in Russia, Turkey and South Africa the macro 
shock tends to trigger a significant decline in output. Where the contraction does take place, GDP 
                                                          
5 A Johansen cointegration test confirms that the systems are characterized by at least one cointegrating relationships. 
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hits a trough approximately 6-8 quarters after the shock. The response of inflation (Figure 4), 
however, is muted: even for the countries experiencing the deepest GDP falls, inflation does not 
follow suit. This dynamics is not surprising, as other complex drivers and factors outside our 
relatively parsimonious model likely drive the reaction of prices in these economies.. Indeed, there 
is ample evidence that the very open nature of EMEs implies a low sensitivity of inflation to 
domestic output developments, other things being equal (see Obstfeld 2020). 
The response of the credit/GDP ratio too (Figure 6) differs across countries. In Brazil, China and 
South Korea credit significantly rises, on average about 5-7 quarters after the shock. Credit 
expansions in these countries are likely to be an endogenous reaction of monetary policy to the 
worsening of international funding conditions. Indeed, for most of the countries, capital inflows 
(Figure 5) tend to decline and the real exchange rate depreciates (Figure 8), as expected following 
a recessionary impulse. This evidence is consistent with a flight-to-safety effect. Monetary policy 
interventions apparently tend to be of a quantitative nature, as the interest rate (Figure 7) does not 
show a significant response, probably because of efforts to limit appreciation pressures on the 
exchange rate. In addition, exchange-rate variations could somewhat blur the response of market 
interest rates to aggregate-demand shocks.  
Based on evidence gathered in, amongst others, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020), the Global 
Financial Cycle hypothesis claims that a single common factor causes substantial international co-
movement in asset prices. Turning to our estimates of the response of stock prices (Figure 9), we 
find a generalized tendency of equity values to fall following the U.S. uncertainty shock. This result 
is particularly valuable as we derived it at the quarterly, business-cycle frequency of our analysis. 
We detect a stronger response (peaking at around -5% / -10%) with the financial variety of the 
shock. This effect is much less evident in the behaviour of house prices (Figure 10): only in South 
Africa the decline is statistically significant. This lack of significant reaction might be due to the 
more sluggish dynamics and complex determinants of property values. 
Overall, many of the responses of EME countries appear stronger than for the U.S. economy. 
As regards output and prices, our results are generally at odds with those of Bhattarai et al. (2019), 
as they find a steady fall in these variables. On the other hand, we also find non-significant 
responses in output and prices of Latin American countries (Brazil and Mexico in our sample). Our 
results for the exchange rate, stock prices and capital flows are consistent with Bhattarai et al. 
(2019). However, our framework allows us to better characterise cross-country heterogeneity in 
the responses, which indeed turns out to be substantial. 
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Historical decomposition of data into shocks further assists us in understanding the role of 
uncertainty shocks. Specifically, each chart in Figures 11-19 plots the portion in the variable’s 
historical dynamics - more precisely, of the deviation from its initial or steady-state level - that is 
due to each of the structural disturbances and to the U.S. uncertainty shock. As before, we show 
estimates obtained by inserting alternatively the financial and macroeconomic variety of the U.S.-
originated uncertainty disturbance. The dynamics we uncover are quite rich in that they allow to 
clarify the key role of uncertainty during notable macroeconomic events of each country. Besides, 
we summarize in Table 2 the main regularities: we list the variables for which U.S. uncertainty 
triggers a rise (+) or a fall (-), and type in bold the strongest contributions.    
Estimates confirm that both types of U.S. uncertainty have had substantial effects on the variables 
of the system. The largest proportional contributions - either positive or negative - of uncertainty 
shocks have been to the dynamics of capital flows, GDP, credit, stock prices and the short interest 
rate. Macro uncertainty accounts for slightly smaller contributions, for in some countries it tends 
to elicit responses of a different sign. Capital flows appear as particularly sensitive to uncertainty 
shocks. As for GDP, U.S. uncertainty seem to contribute significantly to output fluctuations in all 
economies bar China, the largest one. Interestingly, it tends to prompt systematic contractions in 
South Korea, perhaps because it also engender an increase in the short rate, and an expansionary 
effect for Turkey and South Africa, where credit tends to increase. In all remaining economies, 
though substantial, its impact is more difficult to classify. Last, the decomposition points to U.S. 
financial uncertainty shocks accounting for a negative impact on stock market values in Brazil, 
Czech Republic and South Africa; a positive one for India, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South 
Korea. This evidence confirms the international propagation of adverse uncertainty shocks through 
international stock indices. 
 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we explore empirically the transmission of U.S. financial and macroeconomic 
uncertainty to emerging market economies (EMEs). With the help of two varieties of uncertainty 
shocks derived in the context of a Bayesian VAR on U.S. quarterly data, we estimate VAR models 
for nine major Emerging-Market Economies. The differentiated dynamics we uncover shed new 
light on the nexus between U.S. funding conditions, their interplay with uncertainty, and their joint 
propagation to key macroeconomic and asset values worldwide.   
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Our estimates for the U.S. show that uncertainty shocks have significant adverse effects on the 
level of economic activity. Both real and financial variables follow a clear recessionary path, with 
GDP undergoing a particularly strong and persistent downturn when we employ the 
macroeconomic definition of uncertainty in our VAR. 
However, we detect significant cross-country differences in the responses of EMEs’ business cycles 
to U.S uncertainty shocks. While in some countries heightened uncertainty does trigger significant 
output contractions, others exhibit responses that are essentially muted. The same mixed picture 
emerges for inflation, interest rates, credit aggregates and capital flows: some economies seem 
more tightly connected with U.S. monetary and uncertainty developments than others. We thus 
confirm that differences in institutional arrangements or in macro-financial vulnerabilities may 
account for critical heterogeneity in the sensitivity of local business cycles to international 
developments. On the other hand, our results for stock prices (not those for property values) 
corroborate the Global Financial Cycle hypothesis: stock prices display a generalized tendency to 
fall following the U.S. uncertainty shock, especially of the financial type, as expected. 
As regards future extensions, we plan to improve upon the identification of uncertainty shocks by 
exploiting narrative and sign restriction as in Redl (2020)6 and, possibly, adopt some magnitude 
restriction in the spirit of Ludvigson et al. (2019). This would allow us to allow for contemporaneous 
feedbacks between uncertainty and other macroeconomic variables.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Antolin-Diaz and Rubio-Ramirez (2018) develop narrative restrictions.   
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Figure 1, US: VIX and implied macro and financial uncertainty shocks.  
Estimated uncertainty shocks, 1980Q2-2018Q4. The lines represent the VIX (rescaled and demeaned, blue line) and the uncertainty shock, derived from 
estimation of the VAR model for the US, alternatively using the macroeconomic (continuous red line) and the financial (dashed black line) indicators as 
computed by Jurado et al. (2015). The shaded bars denote NBER-dated recessions of the US economy. 
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Figure 2: US 
Panel a: Model with financial uncertainty 
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Figure 2: US 
Panel b: Model with macroeconomic uncertainty 
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Figure 3: Real GDP 
IRFs to financial (blue) and macroeconomic (red) uncertainty shock 
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Figure 4: GDP deflator 
IRFs to financial (blue) and macroeconomic (red) uncertainty shock 
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Figure 5: Capital inflows as a ratio of GDP 
IRFs to financial (blue) and macroeconomic (red) uncertainty shock 
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Figure 6: Credit to private sector as a ratio of GDP 
IRFs to financial (blue) and macroeconomic (red) uncertainty shock 
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Figure 7: Short-term rate 
IRFs to financial (blue) and macroeconomic (red) uncertainty shock 
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Figure 8: Real effective exchange rate 
IRFs to financial (blue) and macroeconomic (red) uncertainty shock 
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Figure 9: Stock prices 
IRFs to financial (blue) and macroeconomic (red) uncertainty shock 
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Figure 10: House prices 
IRFs to financial (blue) and macroeconomic (red) uncertainty shock 
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Figure 11: Historical decomposition for Brazil 
 
a) Financial uncertainty shock 
 
b) Macroeconomic uncertainty shock 
 
Legend: blue – GDPR, orange – GDPD, yellow – credit/GDP, purple – capital inflows/GDP, green – short 
term rate, light blue – stock prices, red – REER, pink – uncertainty. 
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Figure 12: Historical decomposition for China 
 
a) Financial uncertainty shock 
 
b) Macroeconomic uncertainty shock 
 
Legend: blue – GDPR, orange – GDPD, yellow – house prices, purple – credit/GDP, green – short term rate, 
light blue – stock prices, red – REER, pink – uncertainty. 
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Figure 13: Historical decomposition for Czech Republic 
 
a) Financial uncertainty shock 
 
b) Macroeconomic uncertainty shock 
 
Legend: blue – GDPR, orange – GDPD, yellow – house prices, purple – credit/GDP, green – capital 
inflows/GDP, light blue – short term rate, red - stock prices, black – REER, pink – uncertainty. 
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Figure 13: Historical decomposition for India 
 
a) Financial uncertainty shock 
 
b) Macroeconomic uncertainty shock 
 
Legend: blue – GDPR, orange – GDPD, yellow – credit/GDP, purple – capital inflows/GDP, green – short 
term rate, light blue – stock prices, red – REER, pink – uncertainty. 
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Figure 15: Historical decomposition for South Korea 
 
a) Financial uncertainty shock 
 
b) Macroeconomic uncertainty shock 
 
Legend: blue – GDPR, orange – GDPD, yellow – house prices, purple – credit/GDP, green – capital 
inflows/GDP, light blue – short term rate, red - stock prices, black – REER, pink – uncertainty. 
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Figure 16: Historical decomposition for Mexico 
 
c) Financial uncertainty shock 
 
d) Macroeconomic uncertainty shock 
 
Legend: blue – GDPR, orange – GDPD, yellow – credit/GDP, purple – capital inflows/GDP, green – short 
term rate, light blue – stock prices, red – REER, pink – uncertainty. 
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Figure 17: Historical decomposition for Russia 
 
a) Financial uncertainty shock 
 
b) Macroeconomic uncertainty shock 
 
Legend: blue – GDPR, orange – GDPD, yellow – credit/GDP, purple – capital inflows/GDP, green – short 
term rate, light blue – stock prices, red – REER, pink – uncertainty. 
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Figure 18: Historical decomposition for South Africa 
 
a) Financial uncertainty shock 
 
b) Macroeconomic uncertainty shock 
 
Legend: blue – GDPR, orange – GDPD, yellow – house prices, purple – credit/GDP, green – capital 
inflows/GDP, light blue – short term rate, red - stock prices, black – REER, pink – uncertainty. 
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Figure 19: Historical decomposition for Turkey 
 
a) Financial uncertainty shock 
 
b) Macroeconomic uncertainty shock 
 
Legend: blue – GDPR, orange – GDPD, yellow – credit/GDP, purple – capital inflows/GDP, green – short 
term rate, light blue – stock prices, red – REER, pink – uncertainty. 
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Table 1: Data summary 
COUNTRIES SAMPLE 
VARIABLES 
Real GDP 
GDP 
deflator 
Capital 
flows 
Credit/GDP 
Stock 
prices 
House 
prices 
Short term 
rate 
Real eff 
exch rate 
Brazil 
1996q1 
2018q4 
OxE OxE 
IMF 
(BOP) 
BIS MSCI - 
Deposit 
IMF(IFS) 
OECD (MEI) 
China 
1994q2 
2018q4 
OxE OxE - BIS 
IMF 
(IFS) 
OxE 
Deposit 
IMF(IFS) 
OECD (MEI) 
Czech 
Republic 
1994q1 
2018q4 
OxE OxE 
IMF 
(BOP) 
BIS OxE OxE 
Money 
market 
IMF(IFS) 
IMF (IFS) 
India 
1982q2 
2018q4 
OxE OxE 
IMF 
(BOP) 
BIS OxE - 
Interbank 
OECD(MEI) 
OECD (MEI) 
Mexico 
1982q2 
2018q3 
OECD 
(QNA) 
OxE 
IMF 
(BOP) 
BIS 
OECD 
(MEI) 
- 
Deposit 
IMF(IFS) 
OECD (MEI) 
Russia 
1998q1 
2018q4 
OxE OxE 
IMF 
(BOP) 
BIS MSCI - 
Deposit 
IMF(IFS) 
OECD (MEI) 
South Africa 
1985q1 
2018q4 
OECD 
(QNA) 
OxE 
IMF 
(BOP) 
BIS 
IMF 
(IFS) 
BIS 
Deposit 
IMF(IFS) 
IMF (IFS) 
South Korea 
1982q2 
2018q4 
OECD 
(QNA) 
OxE 
IMF 
(BOP) 
BIS 
IMF 
(IFS) 
OxE 
Money 
market 
IMF(IFS) 
OECD (MEI) 
Turkey 
1986q1 
2018q4 
OECD 
(QNA) 
OxE 
IMF 
(BOP) 
BIS OxE - 
Deposit 
IMF(IFS) 
OECD (MEI) 
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Table 2. Historical decomposition, summary of contributions (positive/negative). Variables listed in bold 
display the strongest contributions following U.S. uncertainty shocks. 
 U.S. Macro Uncertainty U.S. Financial Uncertainty 
Brazil GDP (+/-), inflation (+/-), credit (+/-), 
capflows (+/-), short rate (+/-), stock prices 
(+/-), REER (+/-) 
GDP (+/-), inflation (+/-), credit (+/-), 
capflows (+/-), short rate (+/-), stock prices 
(+/-), REER (+/-) 
China Inflation (+/-), credit (-), short rate (+), stock 
prices (+) 
Inflation (+/-), credit (+), short rate (-), stock 
prices (-) 
Czech Republic GDP (+/-), inflation (+), house prices (+/-), 
credit (+), capflows (+/-), short rate (+), 
REER (+) 
GDP (+/-), house prices (+/-), credit (+/-), 
capflows (+/-), short rate (-), stock prices 
(+/-), REER (+/-) 
India credit (+), capflows (+/-), short rate (+), 
stock prices (+/-), REER (+/-) 
GDP (+/-), inflation (+/-), credit (+/-), 
capflows (+/-), short rate (+/-), stock prices 
(+/-), REER (+/-) 
South Korea GDP (-), inflation (+), house prices (+/-), 
credit (+/-), capflows (+/-), short rate (+), 
stock prices (+/-), REER (+) 
GDP (-), inflation (-), house prices (+/-), 
credit (+/-), capflows (+/-), short rate (+), 
stock prices (+/-), REER (+/-) 
Mexico GDP (+/-), inflation (-), credit (-), capflows 
(+/-), short rate (+/-), stock prices (+/-), 
REER (+) 
GDP (+/-), credit (+/-), capflows (+/-), short 
rate (+/-), stock prices (+/-), REER (+/-) 
Russia GDP (+/-), inflation (+/-), credit (+/-), 
capflows (+/-), short rate (+/-), stock prices 
(+/-) 
GDP (+/-), inflation (+/-), credit (+/-), 
capflows (+/-), short rate (+/-), stock prices 
(+/-) 
South Africa GDP (+), inflation (+), house prices (+/-), 
credit (+), capflows (+/-), short rate (+), 
stock prices (+/-), REER (-) 
GDP (+), inflation (+), house prices (+/-), 
credit (+), capflows (+/-), short rate (+), 
stock prices (-), REER (-) 
Turkey GDP (+), inflation (+), capflows (+/-), short 
rate (-), stock prices (+/-) 
GDP (+), inflation (+), credit (+/-), capflows 
(+/-), short rate (+/-), stock prices (+/-) 
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